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In 2006, residential integration based on income was included for first time as a main goal 
in Chile’s national housing policy. In 2015, the National Council for Urban Development (Consejo 
Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano, CNDU) challenged the homeownership voucher program employed 
to achieve this goal and recognized the inexistence of any official instrument to measure 
segregation in Chile. This thesis responds to these concerns and i) provides an index to measure 
residential segregation of subsidized low-income households; ii) analyzes the index’s change during 
the last decade; and iii) uses these findings to evaluate whether the new policies introduced in 2006 
have reduced the levels of residential segregation in the Region of Santiago (RS). The study 
demonstrates that new housing policies have not reduced the levels of residential segregation 
affecting subsidized low-income households in Santiago. Complementary, the thesis analyzes the 
relation between spatial clusters of government assistance with poverty rates, overcrowded 
conditions, physical deficiencies, infrastructure and social problems, to demonstrate the persistence 
of negative urban conditions associated to the location of subsidized stock.
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1.1. Conceptualizing residential segregation 
The term segregation refers to the differences or inequalities within a group, which 
separates group’s individuals in different categories with hierarchical distinctions (Rodríguez 2001). 
Territorial segregation, as the name indicates, is the kind of segregation that considers geographic 
location as the main category to separate the individuals. Consequently, the term residential 
segregation—one kind of territorial segregation—refers to the stratification of households made 
tangible through spatial proximity or territorial agglomeration of families belonging to the same 
social group. This stratification can be built upon socio-economic attributes, such as a household’s 
income, educational attainment, and material wealth; or socio-cultural attributes like race, ethnicity, 
language, or religion (Sabatini, Cáceres and Cerda 2001, 27). Both Chilean policies employed since 
2006 and this thesis, address residential segregation of subsidized low-income households. This 
kind of segregation will be referred from now on simply as residential segregation. 
Chilean cities—as many other Latin-American cities—are known by their “large scale” 
residential segregation. This means the presence of i) large districts with concentrated subsidized 
low-income housing, and ii) notorious agglomerations of high-income districts located in specific 
areas of urban expansion geographically separated from the “poor” areas. However, Chilean cities 
also experience residential segregation at a “small scale,” or the existence of small homogeneous 
districts sparsely located in the territory (Rodríguez 2001, Sabatini, Cáceres and Cerda 2001).  
As illustrated in Figure 1, the district A4 is composed by only one kind of individuals, thus, it 
can be considered as a segregated district from others in the city (at a large scale); however, the 
idea of segregation within A4 (at a small scale) is meaningless, since there is no one to segregate. 
The same applies in the opposite case, where specific individuals can be sparsely located through 
the territory (integrated at a large scale) but segregated at a small scale. This is the case of districts 
A1 and A3. Both districts have 25% of poor (or subsidized) individuals, being equally “inclusive” at a 
large scale (at least more inclusive than district A2). However, at a small scale it is clear that A1—
where a homogeneous hierarchy of individuals is concentrated in one specific area—is more 
segregated than A3, where the same individuals are randomly distributed. 
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This methodological distinction between scales is important to understand the kind of 
segregation each policy aims to address, and to evaluate the mechanisms employed to do so. In 
Chile, the attention given from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU)1 to 
residential segregation tried to address both i) vast agglomerations of subsidized housing in 
peripheral areas (large scale segregation), and ii) homogeneous neighborhoods where poor 
subsidized households have null opportunities to interact with families of different social status 
(small scale segregation). These two urban conditions together have created environments of 
subsidized low-income housing concentrations where opportunities or social mobility are limited, 
and where social mistrust, violence, and social fragmentation are accentuated (Katzman 2001, 
Tironi 2003, Sabatini , Mora, et al. 2013, Bresciani 2016). 
                                                             
1 The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development of Chile (MINVU, from Spanish Ministerio de Vivienda y 
Urbanismo) is in charge of planning and land regulations throughout the country. It is composed by the 
Ministry’s Regional Offices (SEREMIs), and Housing and Urbanization Services (SERVIU) of each region. 




1.2. Thesis question 
The New Housing Policy promoted by MINVU in 2006, addressed segregation of 
subsidized housing at both small and large scale, by introducing two specific instruments: 
i) A new voucher to finance mixed-income developments at neighborhood level (i.e. 
avoid homogeneous concentrations like in district A1, depicted in Figure 1). 
ii) A location voucher to increase the purchasing power of low-income families in order 
to facilitate their access to high quality locations (i.e. allow poor subsidized units to 
afford district A4 according to the scenario described in Figure 1). 
Complementary, and just after the introduction of the new policy, the government decided 
to increase the public expenditures assigned through housing subsidies. During Michelle Bachelet’s 
first administration (2006-2009) the annual provision of subsidized housing increased from 463 per 
100,000 habitants (the average from 1964 to 2006) to 1,068 per 100,000 habitants. As shown in 
Figure 2, those levels of housing production remained through the following administration of 
Sebastián Piñera and the second Bachelet mandate with 1,139 units and 1,045 units per 100,000 
habitants respectively (Valenzuela-Levi 2016). Despite the important increase in subsidized housing 
production under the ‘new agenda,’ by 2013 just twenty mixed-income projects were built 
nationwide, and only three were located in the region of Santiago (Sabatini , Mora, et al. 2013, 12). 
Government assistance in this context was canalized through the pre-existing housing vouchers 
rather than through the new ‘inclusionary’ ones.  
Based on this and other factors, the CNDU highly criticized in 2015 the exclusionary 
character of the voucher system, and the disconnection between the existing planning tools (land 
use ordinances, FARs, and other building codes) with the goals of residential integration (CNDU 
2015, Ch.5, 1). According to CNDU, residential segregation cannot be solved just through the 
voucher system, since without zoning tools to ensure mixed-income communities, land markets will 
continue to exclude vulnerable populations from the areas valued by public action. Considering the 
attention given to residential segregation, the structural flaws evidenced by CNDU, and the alleged 
exclusionary effects of the voucher system (CNDU 2015, Bresciani 2016), this thesis aims to  
address the problem from a planning perspective, and evaluate how the national increment of 
public-housing production has affected the levels of residential segregation by income in the RS. 
9 
 
Source: Valenzuela-Levi, 2016. 
2. Background 
2.1. Chilean demand-voucher system 
Housing assistance in Chile works through a voucher system. Under this system, the 
state’s role is limited to providing a payment to qualifying citizens with which they can purchase any 
unit provided by the private sector. Under this regime, the private sector is in charge of designing, 
distributing and building houses, while the state subsidizes the demand through vouchers, i.e. 
citizens are ‘consumers’. According to SERVIU’s coordinator of social housing, Pablo Ivelic: 
“SERVIU works by subsidizing demand, in effect what SERVIU does is to allow the market work 
(…) and the market works by pursuing the interest of for-profit companies.” (Edwards 2013)  
















Depending on the criteria employed, the privatization of social housing in Chile2 is an 
unprecedented policy success, or a shortcut for socio-economic segregation and ghettoization. The 
paradox of this neoliberal social housing experiment can be summarized by two facts: the first one 
is the dramatic quantitative reduction in the numbers of families with housing problems; in 1990, 
30% of families lacked adequate housing solutions (squatter settlements or illegal occupations) and 
that figure has now fallen to 9% (Bresciani 2016). The second fact is that many of the social 
housing projects built during this period of accelerated construction (1990-today) are universally 
acknowledged as ghettos located in isolated outposts lacking basic facilities, prone to fires, and 
often high in crime and social problems (Edwards 2013, CNDU 2015, Bresciani 2016). A brief 
consideration that explains this phenomenon, is that by directing government assistance to 
consumers, there is no ‘contractual arrangement’ or mechanism between the government and the 
private sector to enforce (nor incentivize) the provision of better quality units from private 
developers. 
In this regard, the private sector is practically under a laissez-faire regime, tending to 
optimize profits by cutting-corners at least in three moments of housing production. The first 
moment is in the definition of the project’s scale; in order to optimize economies of scale, 
developers tend to organize serialized processes of production, designing massive developments 
usually for only one single niche of consumption (low-income vouchers’ users). This way, 
developers produce large agglomerations of homogenous subsidized households that have no 
contact with different social classes. In a second moment, and in order to have access to these 
extensive quantities of land at a convenient price, developers locate these large agglomerations in 
peri-urban areas where these amounts of land are available at the lowest-cost (Brain, Cubillos and 
Sabatini 2009). Finally, a third moment is the construction phase, often characterized by the use of 
cheap building materials and minuscule spaces. With almost no regulation from the state, and 
secured demand—composed by all low-income households that have no other choice than 
acquiring these ‘low quality units’—the proliferation of peripheral ‘subsidized ghettos’ became a 
common phenomenon throughout the country. As recognized by many urban scholars, the success 
                                                             
2 Implemented in 1975 during Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990) 
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of the system from its quantitative perspective created at the same time important agglomerations 
of concentrated poverty, located in the outskirts of the city, and subject to progressive physical and 
social deterioration negatively affecting the wellbeing of its inhabitants (Katzman 2001, Tironi 2003, 
Zambrano 2010). These negative consequences of the demand-voucher system are exactly what 
the policies in 2006 aimed to combat. 
2.2. Instruments towards residential integration 
All Chilean vouchers work by subsidizing homeowners’ demand. This means that MINVU 
provides a fixed amount of money, only granted once, to low-, moderate- and middle-income 
households to acquire any new property available in the market. From 1990 to 2016, MINVU 
granted USD $26.3 billion in subsidies; 99.6% of the subsidies were given to households to acquire 
or maintain their units (homeowners), and only 0.4% were designated to rental assistance (MINVU-
CEHU 2016). In other words, it is a type of homeownership voucher program. Re-sales are 
forbidden unless the owner obtains a direct approval from authorities (the unit must have more than 
5 years, no pending debts, or active SERVIU’s prohibitions). With low rates of turnover, the system 
is an important engine of new housing stock’s creation, as aforementioned in section 1.2. 
The two instruments introduced in 2006 to battle residential segregation follow this same 
rationale in promoting the new agenda, but attaching specific requirements that the unit acquired 
must comply—such as quality, location, or developments’ social integration—in order to qualify for 
voucher. The first policy analyzed in this thesis, the mixed-income bonus, applies only to low- and 
moderate-income households; while the second, the location voucher, mainly to middle-income 
households (see detailed segmentation in Table 1). Without fundamentally challenging the 
dynamics between housing and the real estate market, the inclusion proposed is heavily 
constrained by the risk and expected rates of return of developers. The inclusion at neighborhood 
scale only considers the mix between poor- and slightly less poor-households (usually in the 
periphery), while middle-income households (with higher purchasing power to afford better land) are 
the only beneficiaries of the “large scale inclusion”—or the ones with the opportunity to access 
better quality locations. 
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2.2.1 Mixed-income bonus 
The mixed-income bonus is the only initiative explicitly designed to reduce residential 
segregation by income at a small scale, which means, bringing low-income households to live 
together with moderate-income households in the same development. The government introduced 
the voucher with the New Housing Policy (2006), restructured it with the Supreme Decree No. 116 
(D.S. 116 in 2014), and readjusted it again with the Supreme Decree No. 19 (D.S. 19 in 2016)3. 
Today, it forms part of the Extraordinary Program of Social Integration, administered by MINVU, in 
collaboration with the Ministry's regional offices (Secretarías Regionales Ministeriales or SEREMIs). 
As any other demand voucher, the government offers the bonus to households organized 
through social housing organizations (known as EGISs by their Spanish initials). In order for 
households to qualify, the property acquired (new constructions) must be part of a mixed-income 
development where 20% to 60% of its units are set aside for populations below the first income 
quintile (approximately from E2 to D). With the bonus, low- and moderate-income beneficiaries 
reduce the mortgage credit they need to acquire the unit, and increase their chances to obtain the 
loan. With safer demand, developers increase its sales speed thus reducing the financial costs of 
the project. The market—following these incentives—should supply customer-oriented products to 
satisfy the demand created by the voucher. 
It is important to clarify the autonomy of this voucher compared to other acquisition 
subsidies available for low-income households (i.e. D.S.49), or for middle-income households (i.e. 
D.S. 1) which are commonly complemented with other government subsidies (i.e. the location 
voucher). The D.S. 19 works by itself and combines a triple assistance composed by an i) 
acquisition voucher, ii) an incentive depending on the percentage of subsidized units involved—a 
bonus for captured subsidies—and, iii) a mixed-income bonus. The values described in Table 2 are 
the maximum amounts that households can obtain based on their socio-economic characteristics. 
However, these maximum values are sensible not only to the administrative region of the country 
where the development is located, but also to the project’s zoning context, design, typology, prices,  
                                                             




Table 2. Maximum levels of assistance as defined by D.S.19 (in American dollars) 


















<44,792 814-1,222 32,579 2,036 9,773 44,385 99% 










13,723 ------ ------ 37,340 38% 
Percentage of Subsidized Units     
 
20% - 25% ------ ------ ------ 2,036 4,072 ------ ------ 
25% - 30% ------ ------ ------ 4,072 8,144 ------ ------ 
30% - 35% ------ ------ ------ 6,108 10,180 ------ ------ 
35% - 60% ------ ------ ------ 8,144 12,216 ------ ------ 
   Source: MINVU, D.S. N°19, DO 07.14.2016 
Table 1. Income levels and socio-economic segmentation in Chile 
Income levels 
Groups of  
socio-economic  
segmentation 
Income for a  
Household of 1  
(Annual UDS) 
Income for a  
Household of 3  
(Annual USD) 
High 
A  >   $ 68,667 >   $ 153,769 
B1 >   $ 42,045 >     $ 94,135 
B2 >   $ 25,113 >     $ 57,415 
Middle 
C1a >   $ 14,340 >     $ 34,200 
C1b >     $ 8,182 >     $ 19,807 
Moderate * 
C2 >     $ 4,597 >     $ 11,785 
C3 >     $ 2,396 >       $ 6,797 
Low * 
D >     $ 1,189 >       $ 3,780 
E1 >        $ 621 >       $ 2,360 
Extremely Low E2  >             $0 >               $0 
* Income-levels considered by Inclusionary policies. Source: Asociación de Investigadores de Mercado (AIM) 2015. 
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etc. Each SEREMI evaluates and scores these variables to determine the final allocation of 
resources (specified in D.S. 19 regulation). To calculate the mixed-income bonus for low-income 
households, SEREMIs consider the difference (if any) between the total price of the unit, and the 
aggregate value resulting from family savings, the acquisition voucher, and the bonus by captured 
subsidies (MINVU 2016, D.S. No 19, 8). 
2.2.2 Location voucher 
In order to tackle large-scale segregation, the government introduced in 2006 the location 
voucher defined by the Supreme Decree No 174. Following the rationale of the mixed-income 
bonuses already explained—as demand-subsidies—the location voucher works as an extra bonus 
up to USD $7,700 which households may obtain when the property acquired complies with specific 
requirements. Among them, be located in urban areas with access to sewage systems, accessibility 
through major roads, proximity to transportation systems, and being located less than 1.5 miles away 
from health and education facilities. 
The location voucher complements acquisition subsidies for middle-income households (like 
D.S. 49 and D.S. 1 already mentioned but not detailed here) but do not complement the subsidies 
given under the D.S. 19. This is important since middle-income households become the main 
beneficiaries of large-scale integration, while small-scale integration is only planned for low- and 
moderate income household’s which can be integrated between them using the mixed-income bonus, 
but not necessarily in a better location. Although the instrument has been highly criticized—as shown 
in the next section—it is still in operation under MINVU’s decree FSEV 16 (MINVU 2015). 
2.3. Instruments’ implementation and criticisms 
2.3.1 Quantitative evaluation 
After the changes introduced in 2014 to the mixed-income bonus, and just in the first two 
years of D.S.116 implementation (2015-2016) MINVU has assigned 50,462 D.S.116 subsidies. This 
is equal to 18.2% of the total housing subsidies granted from 2015 to 2016, and to 25.3% of the 
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total government resources given through housing subsidies during that period4 (MINVU-CEHU 
2016). An unquestioned improvement compared to the first phase (2006-2013) described in page 8. 
Regarding the location voucher, the lack of specificity of the instrument (Sabatini , Mora, et al. 2013) 
coupled with an important rise in land values, has neutralized the effects of the voucher (ProUrbana 
2010, Sabatini , Mora, et al. 2013). Although the idea that location subsidies might be the causal 
effect on upward land values is something still debated, a general consensus exists in the fact that 
location subsidies tend to rise the demand and expectations from the supply side, and therefore, to 
rise prices in contexts with fixed supply of urban land (Zambrano 2010). An essential contradiction 
emerges when the very problem the voucher is trying to solve, is consequence of the voucher’s 
effect over land markets. This is even more critical considering the hypothesis that these effects in 
land values are not only consequence of the location voucher, but of the voucher system, or 
vouchers in general, which tend to rise prices. 
In a study published in 2004, Francisco Sabatini and Isabel Brain analyze the changes in 
land prices due to the increment of the vouchers’ value. According to the study, which considers the 
period from 1990 to 2004, the voucher system heavily distorted land markets dynamics in Santiago. 
Based on evidence gathered in more than 118 developments (33,298 housing units) built through 
the timeframe selected, they conclude that poor districts in the RS, like El Bosque, Recoleta, or La 
Granja, experienced from 1990 to 2004 a 20% annual value increase per square meter of land. 
Doubling the 10.6% average value increase for the whole capital, and drastically higher than the 4% 
in wealthy districts like Vitacura, Providencia, or La Reina for that same period (Brain and Sabatini 
2004). Through the vouchers’ value adjustments introduced during those years, the government 
motivated a new low-income demand for housing; consequently, private developers built housing at 
a higher pace in areas where the land was cheap, and therefore, this end by increasing the land 
value in these low-income neighborhoods. These trends absorbed 84% of government voucher’s 
readjustments without improving the quality or developments’ location (Brain and Sabatini 2004). 
The overall experience demonstrates that independent of government efforts to reduce the spatial 
                                                             
4 From 2015 to July-2016, the government assigned 277,267 subsidies (a total investment of $3,300 million 
dollars in subsidies). The investment in D.S.116 subsidies is equal to $835 million dollars (MINVU-CEHU 2016). 
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segregation through the market system, the new agenda is heavily constrained by the market 
dynamics in place; namely risk aversion, and profits maximization from private developers to the 
detriment of the quality of the housing stock provided. Despite the D.S.116 program concentrates 
today 18.2% of the vouchers granted since 2015, the deficiencies of the whole system and the 
distortions it generates over land markets overshadow its apparent success. 
2.3.2 Importance of the scale in residential segregation 
The mixed-income bonuses—with the limitations already described—respond to residential 
segregation at a small scale. At a neighborhood level, they supposedly create more economically 
diverse environments, and counteract the creation of socially homogeneous neighborhoods. 
However, they do not deal with residential segregation at a large scale, nor tackle the displacement 
of low- and moderate- developments into areas of the city where land is economically accessible. 
Actually, when SEREMIs define the score given to any mixed-income project, it makes no 
difference if the development is located in poor areas with cheap land, or in a better location. To 
illustrate this, a project located in the district of El Bosque in the province of Santiago (whose 
poverty rates vary around 30%, and presents severe physical deficiencies in its built environment), 
receives the same score than a project located in Las Condes, a district in the same province but 
with high quality built environment and poverty rates below 5%. This framework provides no 
incentives for private developers to pay for good quality or expensive locations. The mixed-income 
bonuses do not address large-scale segregation, and as proven, location subsidies are very 
inefficient in doing so, or definitely worsen the situation considering the land market distortions they 
generate. In this context, the inexistence of any official instrument to measure residential 
segregation provides not only the opportunity, but also the responsibility to address the matter from 
a planning perspective. 
3. Methodology 
Measuring residential segregation—even from the most intuitive approach—requires at 
least three criteria to be defined: 
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i. First, segregation must be understood in relation to a territorial or geographic scale 
of analysis (region, provinces, districts, etc.). In this case, the study will be focused 
in large scale segregation, meaning between sectors and districts. Due to the short 
historical distance and lack of disaggregated data in relation to the mixed-income 
subsidy application, the analysis of segregation at small scale remains pending for 
future studies. 
ii. Second, it is necessary to make explicit the attribute that will differentiate the 
groups physically distanced (income, wealth, subsidies, etc.). 
iii. Finally, the methodology to measure segregation will depend on the attributes 
selected; for example, measuring a dichotomous attribute like subsidized housing 
(i.e. subsidized units vs. market units) will require a different technique than a 
continuous variable such as income, in which any attribute’s value is possible. 
Being this the case, the thesis considers—as section 3.4 will explain—two main 
methodologies; the Dissimilarity Index for measuring segregation based in 
dichotomous variables such as subsidized stock and poverty, and the Index of 
Residential Segregation, for measuring segregation based on income. 
3.1. Geographic scale of analysis 
3.1.1 Higher order: Santiago Metropolitan Region (RS) 
Regions are the higher territorial division in Chile5, and sixteen of them conform the national 
territory as shown in Map 1. The RS, where the capital is located, is the smallest region in the 
country with only 15,209 km2; however, it concentrates the higher population with a total of 
7,399,042 habitants (40% of the national population by 2016) according to the estimates of the 
National Statistics Bureau (INE from Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadística). As can be inferred 
from its GDP by 2012, the RS stands as a nationwide center of economic activity. Due to the  
                                                             
5 Regarding its political administration, a regional government composed by a regional council and a regional intendant 
(appointed by the President) command each region. The intendant is a territorially deconcentrated governing body and, at 
the same time, it is a decentralized administrative organ. 
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centralized character of the country, and the importance of the RS in economic demographic, and 
political terms, the thesis considers the RS as the larger unit of territorial aggregation, or general 
framework of study. 
3.1.2 Intermediate order: Provinces and Santiago’s internal sectors 
Six intermediate geo-political subdivisions or provinces6 compose the RS. They are: i) 
Chacabuco, ii) Cordillera, iii) Maipo, iv) Melipilla, v) Santiago, and vi) Talagante. As Map 2 shows,  
                                                             
6 Each province is administered by a governor, appointed and removed by the President. 




most of the provinces are predominantly rural—partly due to the region's mountainous geography—
and the urban area is concentrated almost completely within the province of Santiago. This way, the 
province of Santiago (the national capital) concentrates 78% of the region's population, as well as 
32 of the 52 districts (the lower order of territorial aggregation) within the RS. 
Santiago urban area is called Area Metropolitana del Gran Santiago (AMGS), and refers to 
the agglomeration of districts that together conforms the “central or metropolitan city” of the region. 
This “urban boundary” considers 32 districts within the province of Santiago, plus some districts 




from adjacent provinces that have been conurbated with AMGS’s urban growth, as Map 3 shows. 
Given the weight of AMGS’s population, it is possible to divide the urban area in six internal sectors 
according to their geographic location: i) east, ii) south-east, iii) south, iv) west, v) north, and vi) 
center (depicted in Map 4).  
These two categorizations (provinces and Santiago internal sectors) conform the 
intermediate order of territorial aggregation; this categorization serves to analyze large-scale 
segregation between sectors. 




3.1.3 Lower order: Districts or “comunas” 
Comunas, the Spanish for boroughs or districts, define the lower level of territorial 
aggregation. These are the most basic administrative unit of the country7 and 52 of them compose 
the RS. The estimated population of each district (and different levels of territorial aggregation) is 
detailed in Appendix 1. All dissimilarity indexes presented in the following sections are calculated for 
this scale of territorial aggregation (which is the one the location subsidy aimed to address). 
                                                             
7 A mayor— democratically elected— and a communal council constitute their administrative body. 




3.2. Selected attributes 
To analyze whether the voucher system has affected the levels of residential segregation 
by income in the RS, it is important to identify first whether the voucher system has contributed to 
the generation of clusters (or dispersion) of subsidized developments. Second, it is important to 
understand how income distribution has evolved between different geographic sectors and districts. 
Complementary, it is relevant to consider whether this matters, or if the concentration of subsidized 
housing is related to other negatives aspects of social marginality. The variables considered are: 
3.2.1 Housing variables 
The housing analysis intends to calculate the percentage of subsidized stock in each district 
and provinces. Specifically, this section aims to identify the existence of spatial clusters of 
government assistance, and their evolution throughout the past decade. 
3.2.2 Income variables 
Income levels are obviously relevant since they not only define the access to better housing 
solutions, but also influence living standards, quality of life, and access to opportunities and 
consumption (Turok, Kearns and Goodlad 1999).The analysis at district level allows to identify the 
percentage of households’ under poverty line and their concentration/dispersion within the urban 
fabric. Other related variables like the incomes by sector of activity (and their spatial patterns in the 
city) are also included in the study to provide an understanding of the spatial distribution of wealth.  
3.2.3 Contextual variables 
Finally, the thesis analyzes a set of indicators such as overcrowding, materiality index, and 
neighborhoods’ social environment, in order to contextualize both the physical and social conditions 
associated to the findings of previous sections (3.2.1 and 3.2.2). Specifically, the indicators are: 
i. Physical environment: This section considers the percentage of units facing 
overcrowding conditions and physical deficiencies, as well as the percentage of 
housing stock facing environmental pollution and infrastructure deficiencies in each 
district. These variables contextualize (in qualitative terms) the districts where 
government assistance is more common. Environmental pollution includes noises, 
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air, visual contamination, trash, odors, landfills and plagues; while infrastructure 
deficiencies look at the proximity and distance to basic urban resources like health 
services, schools, and transportation corridors. 
ii. Social environment: Shows the percentage of housing units per district facing 
problems like robberies, drugs, street prostitution, or insufficient security. This 
variable was included to contextualize in social terms the aforementioned variables. 
3.3. Segregation Indexes 
There is a broad range of procedures and algorithms to measure residential segregation, 
and the spatial dispersion of the variables mentioned above. The next section briefly presents some 
of these alternatives, and explains the reasons behind the selected methodology. 
3.3.1 Duncan’s Dissimilarity Index 
Duncan’s dissimilarity index (D), employed by Brigitte Erbe’s (Erbe 1975) and Michael 
White’s (White 1983) among others scholars, is the most widely used indicator to measure 
segregation. This index is a synthetic indicator that allows the measurement of the social 
composition in territorial sub-units (sectors and districts) in relation to the social composition of a 
territorial unit of higher order (region). The indicator acquires values from 0, when there is no 
segregation, to 1 when there is maximum segregation. It is interpreted as the percentage of 
members within a minority group that should be moved into a different area to reach a situation of 0 
segregation (Rodríguez 2001, 22)  
D applies to any categorical variable, but it is better adapted to dichotomous variables; 
reason why it is very common in American contexts where criteria like race are more significant at 
measuring segregation (differentiating for example between black and white populations). The 
limitations of D has been widely addressed (Sabatini, Wormald, et al. 2008, Link, Valenzuela and 
Fuentes 2015) since it disregards the spatial dimension of segregation at neglecting whether 
neighborhoods are contiguous or not, or the clusters’ size. In any case, it provides a synthetic figure 
which allows to track the evolution of spatial segregation like this thesis aims to measure. 
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3.3.2 Index of Residential Segregation (IRS) or analysis of variances 
Understanding residential segregation as the weight of a particular households’ or 
attribute’s distribution (within a selected sub-unit) over the total variation of a selected attribute, the 
analysis of variances stands as a logical procedure to measure residential segregation when 
working with continuous variables. The methodology considers three variances (social attribute’s 
variances) based on the geographic’ scale of analysis: i) a total variance for the whole area of study 
(RS); ii) a second variance calculated between intermediate territorial order (Provinces and 
Santiago’s internal sectors); iii) a third variance calculated intragroup between the smallest units of 
analysis (the districts within each sector).  
Residential segregation will increase (or decrease) when the weight of the variance 
between territorial subunits over the total variance of the social attribute increases (or decreases). 
For instance, if 100% of the social attribute’s variance (region’s variance) can be explained by the 
territorial sub-unit’s variance (districts’ variance), the degree of residential segregation would be 
maximum at district level. Oppositely, if the districts’ variance explains 0% of the region variance, 
this means that the attribute’s distribution at district level has a random distribution with no 
segregation at all. The methodology then, allows to generate an Index of Residential Segregation 
(IRS, further explained in section 4) which differentiates the scales in which segregation occurs. For 
instance, if the variance between RS’s sectors explain 0% of the total variance of the attribute in 
use, but the variance between districts explain 100% of the variance at stake, this means that 
segregation operates within sectors at a district scale but not between sectors. Consequently, as 
Rodriguez explains in ECLAC’s report: 
“The variance between smaller subunits must be (by logic) 
equal or greater than the variance between higher subunits, and the 
gap between these two figures will indicate the degree of aggregated 
segregation resulting from the segregation between smaller subunits 
(within the larger region) suggesting the geographic scale at which 
segregation operates.” (Rodríguez 2001, 33) 
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In order complement the IRS analysis, the study also calculate the coefficient of variation, 
or relative standard deviation (RSD) in each sector. The RSD is a percentage defined by the ratio of 
the standard deviation to the mean, in other words, it shows the variability of the sample in relation 
to its mean. In this context, it is included as a standardized measure of dispersion of a frequency 
distribution in order to evaluate the heterogeneity or homogeneity within sectors. 
3.4. Research design 
Based in the methodologies described, the research design is defined as follows: 
i. The Index of Dissimilarity (D) was used to analyze segregation’s evolution through 
dichotomous variables, such as poverty levels, percentage of subsidized stock per district, 
overcrowding, stock presenting physical deficiencies, percentage of population actively engaged in 
the labor market, or the percentage of units presenting environmental and social deficiencies per 









|𝑁𝑖=1    [1] 
Where 𝑥𝑖  is the target population of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ
 area (e.g. population below poverty line in 
district  𝑖). 𝑋 Is the total population below the poverty line at the higher order of territorial 
aggregation for which D is being calculated (region), 𝑦𝑖  is the population above the poverty line in 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ area, and finally, 𝑌 is the total population above the poverty line at the higher order of 
territorial aggregation. 
ii. For continuous variables like income, the thesis employs the analysis of variances 
and the Index of Residential Segregation (IRS) briefly explained in section 3.3.2. This allows 
analyzing to what extent segregation occurs between districts or between sectors. Based in the 
methodology suggested in ECLAC’s report (Rodríguez 2001, 28), the IRS is calculated as follows: 
Given a quantitative attribute X (i.e. income) of elemental socio-demographic entities 
(households), and a large scale territorial unit I (RS) which contains different levels of territorial sub-
units geographically ordered (II, III, IV…,Ƞ ), it is possible to calculate: 
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The variance of the sample mean of X, between Ƞ  territorial sub-units II, III, IV…,Ƞ. That 
is, the variance between territorial sub-units within I. This calculation requires to weigh the relative 
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With the total variance [2] and the variance between territorial sub-units [4] it is possible to 
calculate the IRS [5]. The IRS is the proportion of the total variance that can be explained by the 





∗ 100  [5] 
iii. Finally, as mentioned in 3.3.2, the coefficient of variation (CV), or relative standard 
deviation (RSD) complements the IRS calculating the level of dispersion within districts. The RSD is 




    [6] 
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3.5. Sources, assumptions, and limitations 
3.5.1 CASEN Survey of Socio-economic Characterization 
All the data for this study comes from the National Survey of Socio-economic 
Characterization (CASEN, from Spanish Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional), 
currently carried out in a biennial or triennial periodicity by the Ministry of Social Development. The 
survey includes household’s socio-economic information throughout all national territory (urban and 
rural areas). CASEN includes demographic information, as well as education, health, housing, labor 
engagement, and income indicators. This study considers the last 12 available surveys 
corresponding to the years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 
2015. CASEN has a probabilistic and stratified survey design, and as any sample survey, it 
presents estimates of the population. For year 2015, the survey presented an average absolute 
error (at a regional level) of 1.7 percentage points, and an average relative error of 17.7%. 
3.5.2 Assumptions and limitations 
The first assumption to clarify relates to the geographic units of analysis, since depending 
on how they are defined, they will shape the results. The smallest level of aggregation (RS’s 
districts) have local political structures (municipalities) associated to them, and their boundaries 
have been relatively stable through history. However, Santiago’s internal sectors (intermediate 
order) are delimitations broadly applied in formal and informal contexts, but they do not have any 
government structure associated to them, and consequently, the criteria might be questionable. 
Secondly, the CASEN survey, where the bulk of data for this study comes from, is a sample 
survey and therefore, it does not allow an accurate analysis like with Census data (which 
disaggregates the information at a block scale), neither to obtain robust results since, as a sample 
survey, it is subject to sampling and non-sampling errors as previously mentioned. Consequently, 
the results presented in this thesis are estimates of the true value of the variables. Despite this fact, 
CASEN was selected since it allows a more up-to-date information than the Census Data, 




4. Analysis I: Spatial segregation of subsidized housing 
As mentioned so far, the first and most relevant step is to calculate the percentage of 
subsidized stock at each level of territorial aggregation, and look how these figures have evolved 
through the last decade. The analysis goes back to the year 1990 to understand the major trends 
regarding where subsidized housing has been historically built, and to evaluate if there has been 
any change since the implementation of inclusionary policies in 2006.  
The subject of study allows its subdivision in two groups (subsidized units vs. market units) 
and therefore the most pertinent mechanism to measure segregation here is the Dissimilarity index. 
D indicates the percentage of one of the two groups (i.e. subsidized housing units) that would have 
‘to move’ to different geographic areas in order to produce a distribution that matches that of the 
larger area (RS). 
4.1 Subsidized housing stock by district 
As a result of the continuous public incentives encouraging the creation of subsidized stock, 
the percentage of subsidized housing (from the total stock) rose from 18.8% in 1990, to 26.7% in 
2015 (Table 3A). Regarding its location—between sectors (Table 3B)—there is currently a high 
concentration of government assistance in peripheral areas (Chacabuco, Cordillera, Maipo, 
Melipilla, and Talagante) where the amount of subsidized housing averages 34% of their total stock. 
This figure is almost 10% higher than in Santiago, which averages of just 25%.  
Within the AMGS (between districts) there is also significant disparities. As indicated in 
Table 3-B the government assistance goes up to 41.3% in Santiago West, while sectors like 
Santiago East—the cones of elites—barely reach 9%. In Table 4-B1, it is possible to see how the 
subsidized stock built post 2006—year in which the new inclusionary policies were announced—
has been located primarily in sectors like Santiago North, South, and Cordillera; and almost no 
stock has been provided for Santiago Center or East. Thus, it is possible to infer that subsidies 
under the “new” agenda have not been significantly efficient at reverting large-scale segregation 
patterns, since the majority of new stock provided, was located exactly in districts and sectors 
where government assistance has been historically high.  
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Table 3. (A) Historical evolution of subsidized stock as a percentage of total housing stock. (B) 
Distribution of subsidized housing stock by sector of analysis. Year: 2015. 
A. Percentage of subsidized housing (from the 
total housing stock) in RS  
B. Percentage of subsidized housing by sector of 
RS. Year: 2015 
Year Subsidized   Sector Mean 
1990 18.78%  Chacabuco 31.69% 
1992 5.11%  Cordillera 45.55% 
1994 5.11%  Maipo 38.01% 
1996 0.79%  Melipilla 28.28% 
1998 22.57%  Talagante 26.67% 
2000 27.77%  Santiago Center 6.13% 
2003 27.76%  Santiago East 8.58% 
2006 25.60%  Santiago North 24.81% 
2009 27.47%  Santiago South 27.33% 
2011 27.55%  Santiago South East 32.38% 
2013 31.40%  Santiago West 41.30% 
2015 26.70%  Average 28.25% 
Table 4. Concentration of housing stock. (A) Historical. (B) Only considering stock built post-2006  
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Housing Stock  




Post 2006 – 
Subsidized  
Stock Built  
(Number of units)  
(B1) 
Post 2006 – 
Subsidized  
Stock Built  
(as % of district 
total stock) 
Chacabuco 500 3.22% 125 3.94% 
(*) Cordillera 2,688 17.32% 427 13.46% 
Maipo 899 5.79% 211 6.65% 
Melipilla 440 2.83% 105 3.31% 
Talagante 526 3.39% 83 2.62% 
(*) Santiago Center 109 0.70% 24 0.76% 
Santiago East 945 6.09% 206 6.49% 
(*) Santiago North 2,971 19.14% 680 21.43% 
(*) Santiago South 2,861 18.43% 641 20.20% 
Santiago South-East 1,364 8.79% 231 7.28% 
Santiago West 2,219 14.30% 440 13.87% 
TOTAL 15,522 100.00% 3,173 100.00% 
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Figure 3 (Above) “D” evolution (subsidized-market units) between districts. (Below) Evolution of 




























These sectors directly relate with low-income and high poverty levels, as next sections will 
show. This, which might be a positive assessment praising the system efficiency in addressing less 
favored sectors’ needs, can also be interpreted as a system failure concentrating poverty through 
the housing system. However, the intention is not establishing causalities (understand if subsidized 
housing provision follows low-income consumers’ preferences, or whether the location of subsidized 
stock creates those low-income sectors), but rather to understand the effectiveness of the policies 
implemented since 2006, which as can seen in Table 4 has been very modest. 
Figure 3 (Above) presents the evolution of D for the whole region of Santiago considering 
the total number of observations grouped by district level (the smaller level of territorial aggregation 
considered in the study). D indicates the percentage of subsidized housing that would have to move 
to a different district in order to produce a distribution that matches that of the SMR. As the 
tendency line of D shows, the indicator has been increasing over the whole timeframe selected; and 
specifically, it does not show any tendency to diminish during last years (or at least since 2006). 
Figure 3 (Below) complements the aforementioned observations by comparing the historical 
increase in subsidized housing—as a percentage of the total housing stock in each sector—
between Santiago East (represented in black) and the sector of Cordillera (in blue). 
The presence of areas with subsidized low-income housing concentrations, notoriously 
separated from the areas with almost no subsidized stock (Map 5), demonstrates that despite the 
efforts to promote dispersion, new housing policies have not been efficient enough in reverting the 
patterns of residential segregation at a large-scale. As shown in Map 5, the areas with higher 
concentration of subsidized stock are mainly peripheral areas of West Santiago; areas where the 
government assistance has been historically high. As section 4.3 will demonstrate, areas such as 
Santiago North, West, and South—where government assistance through housing vouchers is 
mostly concentrated—are precisely the places where poverty rates are most critical (22.1%, 20.7%, 
and 24.9% respectively). The upward trends on income inequality, shown in section 4.2, also 
complement the aforementioned observations confirming this increase in large-scale residential 
segregation. As analyzed so far, by providing cash assistance to ‘consumers’ the government has 
null incidence in the location of the new housing stock, leaving “location” to be decided by market  
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dynamics. Consequently, wealthy neighborhoods like Santiago East (with higher land values) has 
been losing subsidized housing stock (with a total percentage change of -2.3% between 1990 and 
2015) contrasting with low-income sectors like Cordillera, where the increase has been of almost of 
30% (more details in Appendix 2). 
4.2 Income distribution 
In order to complement the analysis of the subsidized housing stock—its concentration and 
dispersion—the income analysis pretends to understand how wealth is distributed within the region. 
Unlike the previous section that can be analyzed using D, the segregation based on income levels 




(a continuous variable) must be studied using the Index of Residential Segregation. The IRS 
presented is based in three variances obtained from grouping the datasets (for each year) in three 
scales of territorial aggregation. A first variance (the most general one) was calculated using all 
observations corresponding to the RS, available from CASEN survey. This “general” variance, 
calculated using R-Studio statistical software, represents the spread of the whole range of dataset’s 
observations for the largest area of territorial aggregation. A second variance was calculated 
between the averages obtained from grouping the observations by sectors (it is the variance 
between the incomes’ average in each sector). Finally, a third variance was calculated from the 
values obtained by grouping the observations by district.  
With these three variables, it is possible to obtain two IRS, the first one corresponds to the 
sectors’ variance over the total variance (the percentage of the total variance that can be explained 
by sectors’ variance) while the second is the districts’ variance over the total variance (the 
percentage of the total variance that can be explained by districts’ variance). Both IRSs allow 
understanding segregation between districts, as well as between sectors. 
The income analysis considers the total household income, calculated as the sum of 
household’s autonomous money-income and all money-subsidies. The former refers to earnings 
coming from wages, salaries, self-employment, bonuses, rents, interests, private pensions, and 
transfers between private individuals; and the latter (money subsidies) refers to all cash 
contributions from state to individuals as public pensions, health bonuses, etc. (it does not 
considers housing vouchers). All incomes since 1990 to 2015 were adjusted by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI published by INE), and converted to USD according to the exchange rate to date. 
Incomes have significantly increased throughout the region during the period of study. The 
average annual income for the RS in 1990 was USD $111,720, and it doubled by 2015 to USD 
$276,452 (more details in Appendix 3). This probably reflects the overall economic improvements 
that have positioned the country as one of the strongest economies in Latin America during the last 
decade8. As indicated in Table 5, the average annual percentage change (AAPC) in the province of 
                                                             
8 According to El Mercurio, by 2016 Chile’s GDP (US $22,316) far exceeded the one of Brazil (US $15,000) and 
that of México (US $17,000) two of the most important economies in Latin America (El Mercurio 2016). That 
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Table 5. Income AAPC by sector (First year: 1990, End year: 2015). Annual incomes adjusted by 
CPI. Currency exchange CLP $1 = USD $ 0.001514 
Income (USD)  
 
Sectors 1990 2015 AAPC 
Chacabuco 74,164  173,883  5.85% 
Cordillera  136,825  213,701  3.02% 
Maipo 93,659  181,930  4.53% 
Melipilla 73,217  169,765  5.77% 
Talagante 91,007  199,834  5.38% 
Santiago Center 100,876  231,038  5.68% 
Santiago East  333,501   596,253  3.95% 
Santiago North 86,795  186,029  5.21% 
Santiago South 82,912  195,183  5.87% 
Santiago South East 112,390  265,379  5.90% 
Santiago West 95,334  206,211  5.28% 
 
Figure 4. IRS evolution based on income 1990-2015. District’s IRS (in black) Sector’s IRS (in blue) 
                                                             
same year, Chile stood out as the country with greater income disparity among the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). According to the latest OECD’s report, Chile presents a Gini Index of 
0.46—being “0” perfect equality, and “1” total inequality—followed by Mexico (0.45) and the United States 
















Santiago (5.32%) was slightly higher than in the peripheral provinces (with an AAPC of 4.9%) and 
although “poor areas” have a comparative higher AAPC’s increase, there are still important income 
inequalities, as can be seen between Santiago East (averaging USD $596,253 by 2015) and 
Santiago North or Santiago South (averaging incomes of USD $186,029 and USD $195,183 
respectively). The IRS analysis in Figure 4 complement these statements by providing an idea 
about how large-scale segregation has evolved (at both district levels, as well as sector’s level).  
By 2015, the IRS analysis in Figure 4 shows a diminution of residential segregation at 
sectors’ level, however, considering the variability of the sample, it is not enough to support a 
consolidated trend backing up this statement. In any case, as depicted in Map 6, higher incomes 





are concentrated in a few districts of Santiago East—known as the cone of elites—referring to the 
districts of Providencia, Vitacura, Las Condes, and Lo Barnechea. Which is precisely the sector 
where public assistance is null. These trends has been maintained through the period of study, 
which explains the IRS upward trends shown in Figure 4. Regarding small-scale segregation, the 
overall reduction of internal RSDs (see Appendix 3) suggest a homogenization of the internal 
composition of each sector, but it is not enough to reach a strong conclusion about the spatial 
dynamic associated to it. 
4.3 Distribution of poverty rates 
While incomes have been increasing at a constant rate since 1990, poverty rates have 
decreased from 37.3% in 1990, to 18.0% in 2015. The reduction of poverty is more significant in 
Santiago (with an average change of -24.76%) than in peripheral provinces (with an average change 
of -17.59%). This is consistent with the previous findings and the fact that it is precisely the urban 












area where better opportunities are provided. As well as the analysis of subsidized stock, poverty is 
a dichotomous variable that allows its analysis through D, (considering two categories: as 
populations below or above the poverty line). The upwards trends of D, as detailed in Figure 5 
(specially since 2006) show an increase in the levels of segregation based in poverty levels. One 
particular fact of interest is the 10% increase in D, which rose from 17.4% in 2006 to 26.0% in 2013. 
What D indicates, is coherent with the contrast between sectors and their poverty rates: sectors like 
Chacabuco (with a poverty rate of 25.86% by 2015), Cordillera (22.13%), or Santiago North and 
South (20.7% and 24.9% respectively) contrast with sectors like Santiago Center of East, with 
poverty rates of 12.6% and 7.3% respectively (See map 7). 




5. Analysis II: Residential segregation, does it matter? 
As shown in the previous sections, residential segregation by income has not been 
reversed with the policies implemented since 2006; contrarily, it has been increasing ever since. 
However, why does this matter? The literature reviewed, considers residential segregation as one 
of the causes negatively affecting opportunities and social mobility, and a factor accentuating 
violence, social fragmentation and social mistrust. The following sections aim to complement these 
statements, and identify some pressing aspects that may help to guide future housing policies. 
Among the housing indicators analyzed, the ones worth to discuss are i) overcrowding indexes, ii) 
housing stock facing physical deficiencies, and the ii) environmental analysis focused in 




infrastructure (proximity to health services, schools, and transportation corridors) and social 
problems (presence of drugs, prostitution, and street violence). 
5.1. Overcrowding rates per district 
Overcrowding in the context of this thesis refers to units presenting more than 2.5 person 
per room. Although the empirical evidence correlating overcrowding with broader urban problems is 
thin, higher rates might induce psychological and social stress, and cause health problems. In 
general, the percentage of housing stock facing overcrowding conditions has diminished 
consistently since 1990 (from 36.5% in 1990 to 11.3% in 2015). However, there are still significant 
differences between districts (see Appendix No.6). Complementary, map 8 shows higher 
percentages of overcrowded conditions in Santiago South and North with overcrowding rates up to 
27%, contrasting with the west-east corridor whose figures varies between 1% and 10%. 
These contrasts, coupled with the income and poverty disparities already demonstrated, 
can have “very damaging health effects through feelings of personal failure, inferiority, insecurity, 
stress, depression and anxiety [which] can dominate people's consciousness and severely 
undermine their all-important subjective quality of life” (Turok, Kearns and Goodlad 1999, 376) 
5.2. Percentage of units facing physical deficiencies per district 
Complementing the overcrowding analysis, this thesis analyses the percentage of units 
facing physical deficiencies per district. This indicator was built based in the Materiality Index (only 
included in CASEN 2013-2015) which looks at the material quality of roofs, walls, and floors of the  
dwellings. In order to build this indicator for the whole period of analysis, this study provides a score 
between “0” to “1” to each category (0 if “good”, 0.5 if “acceptable”, and 1 if deficient); then, all units 
scoring more than 2.0 were considered “deficient units”. 
As expectable after previous analysis, the higher percentages of units facing physical 
deficiencies are located in peripheral areas and Santiago’s poor sectors (North and South as shown 
in Map 9). This is significant since agglomerations of units facing deficiencies may produce health 
hazards, fire hazards and overall negative impacts on neighbors. It is even more critical if the  
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subsidized units are the ones contributing to the creation of deficient housing stock. One example 
that summarizes the negative consequences of substandard subsidized housing—not only 
presenting physical deficiencies, but also high overcrowding rates—is Bajos de Mena, a massive 
housing complex privately-built between 1990 and 2004 in Puente Alto using government 
assistance, today known as Chilean’s largest ghetto. The housing development of 25,466 units, 
accommodates 122,278 low-income residents. According to CASEN, after its construction, the 
subsidized stock in Puente Alto rose from 11% in 1990, to 60% by the year 2000. 
In 1997—even after the project was fully built—the units began experiencing physical 
deficiencies; and although the government has been investing (ever since) to solve those problems, 








by 2012 it finally decided to announce a special plan to demolish the buildings and relocate Bajos 
de Mena’s population. The decision was based in the deficient quality of the units, the high rates of 
overcrowding, and the concentration of poverty affecting the social being of its inhabitants. The total 
aggregated cost of building and demolishing the complex—without considering repairs and the cost 
of relocation—was more than USD $ 280,165,434 (Edwards 2013, Kilometrocero 2015). Bajos de 
Mena is one example that evidences the pernicious consequences of the low-quality housing stock 
provided with government assistance, but also the inherent moral hazards present in the voucher 
system, created by the lack of incentives for private developers to provide a genuine social good, 




In order to characterize the physical and economic environment where subsidized housing 
is concentrated, the previous sections have evaluated the relationship between subsidized clusters 
and low-income levels, poverty rates, and housing indicators such as overcrowding and physical 
deficiencies. The last step is the environmental assessment, which considers the access to urban 
infrastructure (proximity to health services, schools, and transportation corridors); and their socio-
spatial conditions (presence of drugs, prostitution, and street violence).  
5.3.1. Infrastructure 
The infrastructure assessment aims to evaluate the quality of neighborhoods and 
availability of local services and facilities, a significant factor influencing “people’s views of their 
home area and whether their community matters to society at large” (Turok, Kearns and Goodlad 
1999). At the same time, this variable aims to counteract the lack of information in CASEN 
regarding commuting times—or jobs-homes balance—in order to understand the isolation of less 
favored populations in some areas of the city, something that might affect their sense of social 
inclusion, self-esteem and psychological wellbeing. The analysis considers whether the units are 
located a more than: 
i. 0.6 miles from a transportation corridor 
ii. 1.5 miles from an educational facility 
iii. 1.5 miles from a health center 
iv. 1.5 miles from a supermarket 
v. 1.5 miles from a ATM 
vi. 1.5 miles from a sport facility 
vii. 1.5 miles from a green public space (parks or plazas) 
viii. 1.5 miles from a community center 
ix. 1.5 miles from a pharmacy 
If a unit is facing more than 50% of these conditions, then is considered by this study as 
presenting infrastructure problems. Although there is a relatively good provision of facilities within  
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Figure 7. Units presenting infrastructure problems by sector 
 
Santiago, as shown in Figure 7, there is a critical situation in peripheral areas like Melipilla, 
Cordillera and Talagante, where 20% to 32% of the units are facing infrastructure problems. It is 
important to highlight that these sectors present an important concentration of subsidized housing. 
In Melipilla, Cordillera, and Talagante, 28%, 45%, and 26% of their respective housing stock is 
subsidized (see Appendix 2). In addition, as shown in Table 4 in page 29, those three sectors 
concentrate not only 23.5% of the total subsidized stock historically built by 2015, but also 20% of 
the subsidized housing built since 2006.  
These factors are critical since condemn people with government assistance—which 
usually are tied to the unit through housing mortgages up to 25-30 years—to live in places lacking 
adequate infrastructure or far from transportation corridors that allow them access better jobs 
opportunities. Based on these findings, it is important to envisage a more active role for planning at 
influencing infrastructure provision; in order to mobilize investment from other public and private 
sources into land improvement, strategic development sites and the provision of appropriate 
















Santiago West 4.67% 
Santiago North 4.14% 
Santiago South-
East 4.06% 
Santiago Center 3.82% 
Santiago South 1.98% 
Santiago East 1.07% 
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5.3.2. Social Problems 
The social assessment complements the aforementioned analysis by looking at social 
problems affecting human relations and social capital of the community. Street violence, presence 
of drugs, and prostitution not only erode community values such as tolerance, solidarity or trust, but 
also affect the neighborhood quality, image, stability, cohesion and connections within the 
community. The analysis considers whether: units have witnessed i) graffiti and other street 
damage, ii) street prostitution, iii) people consuming or trafficking drugs in the public space, vi) 
street fighting, and v) shootings. If a unit is facing two or more of these conditions, then is 
considered by this study as presenting social problems.  
Following the trends described so far, the neighborhoods presenting higher social problems 
(as depicted in Figure 8) are Sectors like Santiago South, Cordillera, Maipo, and Santiago North. All 
neighborhoods with high concentration of subsidized stock (historically, and built post 2006), high 
poverty levels, and where physical and infrastructure deficiencies are more common. 
Sector Social Problems 
Santiago south 31.42% 
Cordillera 27.28% 
Maipo 27.10% 
Santiago North 22.47% 
Santiago Center 21.93% 


















6. Major findings and policy recommendations 
Both D and the IRS (employed to analyze income) are two indicators that can effectively 
provide an idea about how residential segregation has evolved during last decades. Although they 
allow analyzing large-scale segregation (at sectors and districts’ scale), it is not possible to analyze 
small-scale segregation using CASEN data. The diminution of internal RSD in each sector 
(regarding incomes, subsidized stock, etc.) suggests that neighborhoods have been experiencing 
processes of internal homologation and therefore, differentiating the total population in different 
sectors according to their wealth. However, without disaggregated data at block level, it is difficult to 




reach a more precise conclusion regarding the internal dynamics or small-scale segregation within 
each district. This analysis will remain pending until new census data is available. 
Regarding large-scale segregation, the study evidences the existence and ongoing 
production of important clusters of subsidized housing in peripheral areas. The increase of large 
scale residential segregation based on income implies that location subsidies, as structured under 
MINVU’s decree FSEV 16, are not being neither efficient enough to battle the large-scale residential 
segregation, nor promoting better locations or low-income housing dispersion. Secondly, it is 
possible to relate the location of those clusters of government assistance, with negative urban 
conditions such as overcrowding (see section 5.1), physical deficiencies (see section 5.2), and 
infrastructure and social problems (see section 5.3). These conditions not only erode the 
opportunities of people receiving government vouchers, but also devaluate the government’s 
investments made through the housing system; perpetuating environments of poverty concentration 
where opportunities or social mobility are limited, and where social mistrust, violence, and social 
fragmentation are accentuated. 
The attempt by the Chilean government to improve the location of subsidized housing and 
generating inclusive communities through the private market is not a novel idea, it has been tried in 
many places including UK, Spain, Italy, among many other European countries. The findings 
depicted through this thesis confirm the general experience worldwide; while private markets are 
efficient partners at encouraging productivity and providing housing, they will never generate social 
benefits without the required incentives. The reason is simple: in the end, someone has to pay for 
the good provided (in this case, the quality guaranteed price for prime locations) and to ensure the 
minimum risk for developers. This makes privatization of social housing a viable yet expensive 
strategy for the government in order to work as desired, since not only is it necessary to “buy” from 
developers (through subsidies, zoning allowances, or tax exemptions) the land that low-income 
households cannot pay, but also to provide the resources that deal with the developments’ risk, and 
thus, maintaining the developers’ rates of return. 
The “inclusion” proposed by Chilean policies almost only occurs today between poor- and 
slightly less poor-households in the periphery without fundamentally challenging the dynamics 
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between housing and the real estate market. In spite of some scholars still arguing for the 
liberalization of urban limits to reduce the value of land, or for increasing (even more) the value of 
subsidies to improve location standards, the Chilean government has already applied those 
strategies without mayor success (Brain and Sabatini 2004). Coming back to the centralized 
government alternative is not a viable solution either, given its lack of productivity (see Figure 2) in 
battling housing shortages. Notwithstanding, and based in the analysis portrayed by this study, 
multiple planning strategies can be implemented to improve the current situation according to the 
goals stated, while dispersing at the same time the economic burden of providing quality-housing 
solutions. Some of them are: 
i. Improve contractual conditions under which vouchers are assigned. 
As described throughout the thesis, government vouchers are assigned based on projects’ 
conditions (location, or a development’s social composition). Therefore, the most direct strategy to 
improve the quality of the stock provided is to improve the government’s requirements at assigning 
the vouchers. Evidently, requiring better locations (proximity to services and transportation 
corridors, quality public space, health facilities, etc.), better quality units (size and material-quality) 
or deeper social mixture, will increase the cost of land, the cost of the building itself, and will 
increase the risk involved in the business; therefore, diminishing the private interest in participate. 
One way to counteract this cost—without increasing the vouchers value—is to adjust the benefits 
provided by the government in form of bonuses or zoning allowances. A brief look into international 
experience in this issue provides a diverse range of instruments such as FAR bonuses, tax credits 
and exemptions, that may be mechanisms easily transferable to a neoliberal context like Chile.  
ii. Implement inclusionary zoning in underutilized areas near transportation corridors. 
The creation of zoning ordinances in underdeveloped areas—mandatory inclusionary areas 
requiring future developments to include a fixed percentage of affordable units in every 
development—will create permanent mixed-income communities in neighborhoods where demand 
increases is expected in the future due to public intervention. This works as a tax—in the form of 
affordable units—to return a fraction of the private benefits received by government investment. 
48 
 
One situation in which this can be applied, is in the areas surrounding the two new subway lines 
projected throughout Santiago that will feed Santiago North and West (Lines 3 and 6), precisely the 
less advantaged areas of the city.  
These new transportation corridors will increase the demand in those sectors, and land 
markets will inevitably displace vulnerable populations from these areas valued by public action. 
Today, without introducing any change in current building codes, 236,806,029 sqf of residential 
FAR are available in less than 0.3 miles of these new subway stations, which equals approximately 
to 411,000 housing units (Greene, et al. 2015). Without specific planning or zoning tools to ensure 
mixed-income communities, households with higher willingness to pay will capture them, displacing 
the low-income communities today living in those zones. 
iii. Apply new subsidies (location and mixed-income subsidies) in existing housing stock as well 
as in new developments. 
Considering location as a scarce resource with fix supply, the requirement to apply 
acquisition subsidies only for new constructions implies its use mainly in peripheral areas (where 
land is available to new developments), usually far from public services which commonly grow at a 
significantly slower pace than urban expansion. Allowing the purchase of second-hand units, would 
save the associated cost of urbanization and will provide a new affordable stock in already 
consolidated neighborhoods. 
iv. Encourage rental tenure:  
The current voucher system works only by subsidizing homeownership. This model is 
diverting an important amount of public resources—and low-income households’ resources tied to 
mortgages up to 20 or 30 years—to acquire a unit that very often gets devaluated given its low 
quality emplacement. This way, the focus in homeownership not only implies an important loss for 
the state and a household’s wealth, but also affect households’ mobility in terms of job 
opportunities, or the adaptability of the voucher system to the changes experienced through a 
household’s life, both in economic terms, and family composition (labour sources, mobility, etc.). 
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v. Affordability outside the market rationale:  
Considering the historical performance and market reactions to the existing voucher 
system, it is expectable that issuing rental vouchers will raise rents. This consideration also applies 
for recommendation “iii” regarding issuing vouchers for second-hand units. One direct solution is 
simply to rely more heavily in regulations, among which rent controls are definitely the most 
effective strategy for keeping housing prices down. Although a “cheap” solution for the State, it 
transfers all the cost to the private sector, with the multiple consequences it has on productivity 
levels. 
The five points depicted above are just a few considerations to improve two specific 
housing policies implemented in Chile under the conditions depicted in this thesis; however, they do 
not pretend to solve a complex issue that involves a multidisciplinary approach. Inclusionary policies 
not only rely in the housing policy itself, but also in the cultural acceptance or willingness to build a 
more inclusionary society. This must be achieved through the educational curriculum, and 
supported by multiple other policies that seek to improve the working conditions, increase the 
minimum wages, provide better public spaces throughout the city, better transportation corridors, 
health plans and pensions, among many other variables improving life conditions in our cities. 
Despite these facts, one important take away is that housing policies in Chile have not only failed 
due to the complexity of a multidisciplinary problem, but due to the unbalance between the dual 
condition of housing policies: “the dual condition of housing as social policy [wealth distribution] and 
as industrial policy [housing production and the benefits it brings to the national economy]” 
(Valenzuela-Levi 2016). 
 Although the voucher system in Chile has reduced the housing deficit from a ‘successful’ 
industrial perspective, it has not been able to provide a genuine social good, and its economic 
success has been coupled with important failures in terms of distribution. To revert this, it is crucial 
to introduce new zoning tools designed for the new inclusionary agenda, and start focusing in the 
social aspect of the policies to meet the minimum quality standards required. Otherwise, land 
markets will continue to exclude vulnerable populations from areas valued by public action, and the 
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8.1. Appendix 1: Population by territorial subunits  
             
i Chacabuco 205,718  26 Providencia 126,595 
1 Colina 119,557  27 Vitacura 78,313 
2 Lampa 69,730  viii Santiago North 928,217 
3 Tiltil 16,431  28 Cerro Navia 129,630 
ii Cordillera 819,206  29 Conchalí 101,796 
4 Pirque 24,779  30 Huechuraba 86,542 
5 Puente Alto 779,984  31 Independencia 48,565 
6 San José De Maipo 14,443  32 Quilicura 230,871 
iii Maipo 490,446  33 Quinta Normal 83,187 
7 Buin 74,692  34 Recoleta 119,303 
8 Calera De Tango 28,589  35 Renca 128,323 
9 Paine 67,648  ix Santiago South 961,603 
10 San Bernardo 319,517  36 El Bosque 164,572 
iv Melipilla 163,198 
 
37 La Cisterna 68,370 
11 Alhué 4,634 
 
38 La Granja 120,144 
12 Curacaví 30,514 
 
39 La Pintana 201,726 
13 María Pinto 11,879 
 
40 Lo Espejo 95,503 
14 Melipilla 108,122 
 
41 Pedro Aguirre Cerda 88,229 
15 San Pedro 8,049 
 
42 San Joaquín 73,197 
v Talagante 285,156 
 
43 San Miguel 68,855 
16 El Monte 31,752 
 
44 San Ramón 81,007 
17 Isla De Maipo 32,554 
 
x Santiago South-East 741,397 
18 Padre Hurtado 51,498 
 
45 La Florida 396,684 
19 Peñaflor 89,190 
 
46 Macul 93,943 
20 Talagante 80,162 
 
47 Peñalolén 250,770 
vi Santiago Center 156,049 
 
xi Santiago West 1,471,245 
21 Santiago 156,049 
 
48 Cerrillos 64,307 
vii Santiago East 847,410 
 
49 Estación Central 107,335 
22 La Reina 94,037 
 
50 Lo Prado 88,305 
23 Las Condes 291,971 
 
51 Maipú 931,211 
24 Lo Barnechea 115,963 
 
52 Pudahuel 280,087 
25 Ñuñoa 140,531 
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(see page v) 
INDUSTRY'S PARTICIPATION IN THE MARKET (by number of observations)
2015 2013 2011 2009 2006 2003 2000 1998 1994 1992 1990 Change
Agriculture, l ivestock, fishing 2.58% 3.61% 5.21% 8.85% 10.46% 11.02% 11.40% 12.29% 12.90% 14.34% 22.48% -19.90%
Wholesale trade 29.19% 36.50% 37.69% 22.48% 20.80% 20.35% 20.39% 19.35% 18.02% 16.57% 18.73% 10.46%
Energy (Electricity, Gas and Water supply) 0.65% 0.45% 0.82% 0.74% 0.62% 0.66% 0.77% 0.87% 0.77% 0.79% 0.00% 0.65%
Finance, Insurance 3.21% 2.83% 2.92% 9.07% 8.57% 8.24% 7.94% 7.20% 6.43% 5.11% 7.68% -4.47%
Real Estate and Construction 21.53% 21.09% 19.94% 8.30% 9.27% 8.44% 7.93% 8.05% 8.99% 9.09% 7.96% 13.57%
Manufacturing 12.99% 14.80% 14.01% 13.43% 15.35% 15.15% 16.50% 16.82% 19.24% 21.87% 22.44% -9.45%
Mining 1.11% 1.18% 1.14% 1.11% 0.81% 0.66% 0.64% 0.54% 0.82% 0.95% 1.11% 0.00%
Other services (exept public administration) 19.69% 10.37% 9.91% 28.40% 27.33% 28.96% 27.54% 28.16% 26.76% 25.61% 11.95% 7.75%
Transportation and Warehousing 9.04% 9.64% 9.17% 8.36% 7.41% 7.19% 7.65% 7.58% 6.84% 6.46% 7.66% 1.39%
Total Observations 23875 14632 10530 19888 21763 21208 19413 20147 15274 15101 10905
AVERAGE INCOME BY INDUSTRY
2015 2013 2011 2009 2006 2003 2000 1998 1994 1992 1990 Change
Agriculture, l ivestock, fishing 223,179$      191,130$      210,565$      136,845$      129,158$      126,296$      117,223$      121,209$      88,074$        96,184$        81,574$        49.2%
Wholesale trade 276,903$      210,307$      239,454$      202,870$      199,810$      215,525$      175,581$      204,971$      199,968$      191,080$      139,997$      35.6%
Energy (Electricity, Gas and Water supply) 362,952$      267,678$      416,800$      198,474$      195,983$      237,832$      166,316$      172,479$      149,171$      242,394$      na 27.0%
Finance, Insurance 420,906$      421,491$      504,029$      301,758$      330,810$      384,184$      281,167$      352,786$      276,965$      299,046$      215,846$      35.1%
Real Estate and Construction 330,692$      306,315$      347,409$      182,765$      185,380$      204,308$      144,689$      181,387$      145,218$      186,815$      105,784$      56.3%
Manufacturing 302,136$      220,519$      239,773$      181,573$      189,409$      199,071$      166,017$      181,224$      201,125$      159,640$      120,901$      45.0%
Mining 421,696$      362,482$      472,582$      273,082$      260,326$      233,716$      207,836$      211,015$      168,418$      185,537$      95,244$        79.7%
Other services (exept public administration) 316,013$      328,249$      374,118$      224,891$      250,085$      264,422$      200,857$      239,714$      268,217$      225,598$      177,585$      32.0%




1b. Average Income by Industry (adjusted by CPI)
Wholesale trade 2015 2013 2011 2009 2003 2000 1998 1994 1992 1990
chacabuco 194,777$        184,028$        174,964$        155,793$        197,337$        142,677$        187,399$        124,203$        102,411$        120,549$        
cordillera 222,888$        169,271$        170,573$        217,060$        172,247$        174,765$        216,066$        201,183$        234,541$        159,822$        
maipo 209,572$        160,163$        177,133$        161,301$        267,580$        135,540$        166,827$        202,393$        156,870$        155,554$        
melipil la 178,621$        149,013$        151,124$        207,231$        172,887$        219,557$        149,260$        115,088$        141,696$        104,731$        
talagante 240,599$        181,662$        215,628$        162,571$        154,936$        143,304$        149,690$        116,024$        171,365$        112,622$        
stgo_c 233,666$        228,605$        238,678$        175,570$        208,820$        219,739$        201,474$        336,412$        147,256$        102,853$        
stgo_e 491,914$        532,663$        635,421$        516,817$        652,457$        491,648$        638,514$        563,094$        525,583$        359,644$        
stgo_n 192,063$        165,341$        181,225$        175,525$        162,509$        161,478$        156,982$        160,691$        151,886$        116,722$        
stgo_s 187,807$        169,487$        172,267$        169,381$        147,797$        151,193$        151,227$        135,635$        156,450$        105,866$        
stgo_se 243,676$        205,154$        192,309$        205,066$        195,068$        165,545$        178,799$        196,815$        132,732$        111,251$        
stgo_w 217,259$        193,702$        207,737$        195,395$        168,903$        165,524$        161,530$        163,923$        155,988$        112,807$        
Energy (Electricity, Gas and Water supply)
chacabuco 305,404$        264,244$        na 141,966$        553,707$        117,527$        187,736$        81,579$           95,935$           na
cordillera 223,699$        199,297$        211,245$        172,997$        163,148$        148,621$        105,441$        127,375$        90,154$           na
maipo 210,425$        184,456$        359,798$        201,333$        220,874$        232,438$        100,932$        165,077$        49,621$           na
melipil la 228,027$        88,075$           145,779$        168,446$        68,296$           161,472$        149,511$        37,882$           94,850$           na
talagante 300,327$        100,235$        175,752$        177,900$        216,217$        103,146$        90,777$           73,788$           95,507$           na
stgo_c 279,076$        na 513,656$        75,979$           87,711$           196,183$        215,342$        131,499$        341,355$        na
stgo_e 790,999$        669,557$        959,949$        440,284$        703,344$        441,304$        450,638$        360,798$        625,511$        na
stgo_n 214,753$        255,510$        145,745$        141,932$        224,385$        161,853$        149,094$        122,075$        107,632$        na
stgo_s 216,663$        197,493$        214,716$        165,504$        160,445$        90,171$           144,284$        161,800$        587,562$        na
stgo_se 567,034$        264,482$        588,295$        252,203$        281,926$        190,116$        240,909$        237,613$        133,125$        na
stgo_w 218,214$        218,722$        197,050$        208,000$        125,248$        146,430$        146,408$        141,793$        117,682$        na
Real Estate and Construction
chacabuco 216,452$        159,250$        211,150$        134,166$        168,392$        95,962$           124,955$        84,357$           80,333$           79,929$           
cordillera 231,667$        197,236$        212,421$        152,950$        198,060$        111,292$        183,912$        157,221$        117,605$        102,899$        
maipo 197,439$        180,039$        189,213$        170,075$        217,672$        130,799$        128,600$        123,471$        94,300$           100,392$        
melipil la 193,548$        155,482$        327,427$        150,895$        138,167$        124,695$        167,294$        106,078$        80,487$           53,711$           
talagante 238,201$        266,030$        252,723$        146,265$        174,782$        143,152$        148,603$        95,949$           133,904$        108,444$        
stgo_c 273,781$        365,016$        350,319$        252,405$        135,948$        152,546$        138,382$        119,824$        172,430$        61,255$           
stgo_e 700,276$        732,288$        792,311$        532,685$        734,783$        565,324$        583,699$        458,361$        805,853$        380,709$        
stgo_n 219,219$        192,327$        198,566$        158,250$        152,184$        131,472$        130,127$        108,960$        105,336$        92,040$           
stgo_s 225,898$        207,618$        170,058$        147,944$        134,899$        123,303$        125,575$        110,913$        99,043$           85,891$           
stgo_se 321,580$        235,490$        262,330$        149,497$        178,774$        124,549$        136,485$        132,277$        113,539$        92,650$           
stgo_w 239,013$        232,950$        248,144$        244,796$        163,436$        126,439$        128,374$        124,044$        101,485$        84,922$           
Manufacturing
chacabuco 165,515$        185,029$        161,304$        141,832$        135,863$        112,367$        111,664$        115,900$        103,721$        75,001$           
cordillera 235,075$        191,908$        166,041$        156,429$        191,752$        182,137$        197,430$        176,845$        161,998$        189,939$        
maipo 194,931$        177,369$        190,986$        160,748$        199,050$        129,372$        296,343$        126,304$        123,624$        112,212$        
melipil la 199,937$        129,944$        213,991$        156,354$        151,227$        171,485$        127,630$        106,614$        93,113$           88,133$           
talagante 190,052$        208,545$        178,705$        152,793$        134,034$        133,363$        128,092$        105,290$        128,581$        127,509$        
stgo_c 220,545$        338,072$        249,505$        225,803$        180,986$        165,134$        205,216$        167,113$        123,295$        112,072$        
stgo_e 539,390$        633,515$        786,873$        560,601$        720,239$        614,203$        595,915$        1,340,908$     586,808$        327,575$        
stgo_n 198,971$        180,125$        173,052$        174,431$        139,618$        139,742$        130,111$        120,499$        122,175$        90,688$           
stgo_s 205,208$        191,907$        165,652$        159,519$        152,018$        134,173$        134,256$        120,923$        123,683$        89,277$           
stgo_se 245,598$        207,287$        255,781$        168,648$        188,378$        167,157$        184,331$        152,294$        110,450$        120,243$        
stgo_w 212,957$        199,426$        209,906$        180,913$        153,049$        137,523$        155,597$        136,265$        130,815$        105,672$        
Other services (exept public administration)
chacabuco 192,831$        192,709$        304,333$        157,530$        202,727$        120,275$        152,602$        102,211$        88,714$           86,669$           
cordillera 228,451$        235,291$        228,027$        186,644$        218,075$        171,305$        198,734$        190,807$        131,639$        138,860$        
maipo 222,889$        200,322$        172,563$        179,686$        215,362$        168,925$        153,044$        161,122$        119,274$        152,273$        
melipil la 196,044$        220,340$        155,562$        177,299$        157,221$        129,156$        129,565$        116,697$        94,849$           120,453$        
talagante 181,553$        213,525$        389,903$        176,105$        170,958$        152,807$        140,920$        110,582$        165,587$        148,402$        
stgo_c 219,705$        395,138$        319,361$        235,940$        196,326$        267,039$        231,233$        213,102$        139,788$        131,603$        
stgo_e 704,254$        664,882$        770,540$        538,516$        670,106$        576,337$        622,960$        743,882$        554,852$        374,171$        
stgo_n 201,058$        217,982$        235,676$        175,132$        169,292$        149,875$        147,513$        133,656$        123,025$        99,959$           
stgo_s 227,211$        234,795$        173,084$        182,269$        148,156$        146,967$        152,268$        132,137$        149,760$        117,517$        
stgo_se 275,654$        270,955$        280,712$        186,525$        186,619$        167,532$        186,708$        175,188$        119,958$        162,793$        
stgo_w 208,264$        238,099$        245,932$        212,796$        155,972$        143,294$        159,750$        155,221$        127,206$        138,626$        
Transportation and Warehousing
chacabuco 205,738$        177,502$        175,044$        168,428$        152,275$        108,179$        151,646$        133,603$        116,838$        86,428$           
cordillera 229,490$        203,076$        228,367$        228,254$        175,111$        254,177$        222,966$        229,861$        202,861$        147,718$        
maipo 188,331$        168,069$        191,031$        179,606$        163,109$        194,698$        134,650$        115,900$        155,605$        124,552$        
melipil la 168,842$        145,186$        219,195$        178,855$        209,867$        139,236$        152,288$        139,757$        117,132$        121,582$        
talagante 194,071$        188,273$        229,710$        182,042$        181,432$        179,651$        139,180$        106,368$        155,868$        120,315$        
stgo_c 269,688$        284,709$        251,630$        161,750$        168,536$        290,382$        257,897$        355,823$        154,575$        111,100$        
stgo_e 566,435$        552,899$        605,476$        529,274$        568,699$        577,013$        424,260$        378,503$        412,244$        432,006$        
stgo_n 215,636$        200,895$        184,728$        190,614$        184,482$        180,998$        154,867$        126,500$        156,887$        102,979$        
stgo_s 231,169$        204,562$        201,981$        199,538$        168,257$        181,055$        165,628$        122,847$        159,227$        104,339$        
stgo_se 314,062$        243,633$        217,240$        198,715$        212,719$        200,199$        222,360$        184,301$        123,397$        134,688$        
stgo_w 269,069$        223,082$        214,275$        223,152$        164,283$        160,972$        171,563$        177,769$        146,182$        115,058$        
vi 
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